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1962/10/24

S authority to:

TS to

1.10

Responence

OI, EO or PA



SCENARIO FOR DISMANTLING AND WITHDRAWAL OF JUPITER MISSILES FROM TURKEY

Basic Assumptions:

- 1. Question of dismantling and withdrawing Jupiters from Turkey.will be introduced into negotiating equation only after other steps -- such as nuclear free zone, invasion guarantee, etc. -- are fully explored and found wanting.
- 2. Every effort will be made to limit any discussion of this issue to the Turkish missiles alone. Italy will not enter finto the picture except in the last resort. Turkey will enter the because of its location on the periphery of the Soviet Union and comparability to the Cuban situation.
- 3. The appeal, first to the Turks and then to NATO, will be solely on the grounds of the common good. No effort would be made of offer a substitute deterrent, principally because such a deterrent is not available without raising a host of other problems
- 4. Non-military considerations, such as increased economic of the second second

<u>Schedule</u>: (D Day is the day on which the decision is made to interject the Turkish missile withdrawal and dismantling problem into the Cuban crisis negotiations.)

D Day. Prepare negotiating package and instructions.

D+1

- 1. Secretary calls in Turkish Ambassador and indicates
 likelihood that USSR may introduce question of Jupiters in Turkey
 into the Cuban crisis discussions. While we are making and will
 continue to make every effort to avoid such linkage, we must
 nevertheless be prepared to deal with the introduction of this
 issue.
- 2. The Secretary would lay out the problems in terms of overall NATO interest. He would explain that NATO capabilities plus those which we have in mind for increasing those capabilities will now and in the future continue to give Turkey every protection that it needs against a Soviet attack. He will indicate that should the Soviets raise the issue of Jupiters in the Cuban discussion and we be unable to respond in a positive and forthcoming manner of our ability to continue to assist NATO will be restricted.
- 3. He will indicate that this is indeed a difficult decision for the Turks for what we are seeking is a unilateral expression of willingness on their part to permit the dismantling of these weapons under some sort of international system of inspection. We also hope that the Turks would at the proper moment be



be prepared to announce their decision publicly as being in the interest of the peace of the Free World.

- 5. While, at the same time that the Secretary is making his presentation to the Turkish Ambassador, our Ambassador in Ankara would be making a similar approach at the highest level there.
- 6. Both the Secretary and the Ambassador would ask the parties to whom they talk to explore with us the best method of handling this problem.

D+2

Based on Ambassador Hare's report of his conversation with the Turkish Government, the Department would provide additional guidance for him to use in discussing the problem in Ankara.

<u>D+2</u>

Ambassador Finletter would talk to the permanent representatives of NATO in Paris indicating to them the need to take this step and the reasons therefor.

D+2

Our Ambassadors in the NATO capitals would make similar approaches to the governments to which they are accredited.







The NATO Council would meet to consider this problem and endorse a course of action under which the Turks would publicly announce their decision to dismantle and withdraw these missiles from their territory.

D+?

At time to be determined, the Turks would publicly announce in the United Nations their decision to take the foregoing step.